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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Deeds-Married Women-Husband's Joinder
In the recent case of Cruthisv. Steele' a wife attemped to convey
to the children of her first marriage, a tract of land which she had
held as tenant by the entirety with her deceased first husband. She
was not joined in the deed by her second husband. The instrument,
dated in 1916 and duly recorded, was under seal and purported to
convey the tract for one dollar, love and affection, subject to the
grantor's life estate. The second husband predeceased her in 1949.
The grantor died intestate survived by children of both marriages.
The children of the second marriage brought a special proceeding
for the sale of the land for partition. The defendants, the daughter
of the first marriage and the heirs at law of the deceased son of
the first marriage, contended that the plaintiffs were in privity with
the grantor and were bound by her deed through estoppel or otherwise. The court held that since the wife was not joined by her
husband in the deed, the deed was void, and since there was no
consideration for this deed it could not be enforced as a valid con-

tract to convey.
In North Carolina any conveyance by a married woman of her

real property without the written assent of her husband is void.'
Since in this state the common law disabilities of a married woman

to contract, with certain exceptions, have been removed, 3 she is
bound by an estoppel the same as any other person,4 but a deed which
is invalid for failure to comply with some constitutional or statutory
1259 N.C. 701, 131 S.E.2d 344 (1963).
Cruthis v. Steele, 259 N.C. 701, 131 S.E.2d 344 (1963); Buford v.
Mochy, 224 N.C. 235, 29 S.E.2d 729 (1944). N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 provides: "The real and personal property of any female in this State acquired
before marriage, and all property, real and personal, to which she may, after
marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and remain the sole and
separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for any
debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be devised and
bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her husband, conveyed by her as
if she were unmarried." The language of the implementing statute, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1950), is identical. Vann v. Edwards, 135 N.C. 661, 47
S.E. 784 (1904) held that the requirement that she have the written assent
of her husband applied only to real property. The court in Perry v. Stancil,
237 N.C. 442, 75 S.E.2d 512 (1953), construed N.C. CONsT. art. X, § 6 to
require the consent of the husband only when a conveyance is executed by
a married woman to a person other than her husband. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 39-13.3(d) (Supp. 1961) provides that the wife may convey directly to her
husband without his joinder in the deed, subject to the provisions of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (1950).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (1950).
'Tripp v. Langston, 218 N.C. 295, 10 S.E.2d 916 (1940).
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provision is null and void in contemplation of law and does not
operate as an estoppel during coverture 5
North Carolina has held in a number of cases6 that a married
woman who conveys her realty without the written assent of her
husband may not after his death recover the land or defeat the title
of her grantee, or those in privity with him, on the ground that the
deed was void for lack of assent of her husband at the time of the
execution. The court has held in these cases that the invalid deed
will be construed as a contract to convey, and specific performance
In each case where the court found that
accordingly required.
there was a contract to convey, the original deed was supported by
a valuable consideration. 8 It would appear then from the decision
in Cruthis that had the purported conveyance of the wife been supported by a valuable consideration, the court would have required
specific performance.'
'Buford v. Mochy, 224 N.C. 235, 29 S.E.2d 729 (1944); Greensboro
Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923); Wallin v.
Rice, 170 N.C. 417, 87 S.E. 239 (1915); Smith v. Ingram, 130 N.C. 100, 40
S.E. 984 (1902).
'Everett v. Ballard, 174 N.C. 16, 93 S.E. 385 (1917); Robinson v.
Daughtry, 171 N.C. 200, 88 S.E. 252 (1916) ; Warren v. Dail, 170 N.C. 406,
87 S.E. 126 (1915); Blacknall v. Parish, 59 N.C. 70 (1860).
'Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960) ; Mills v. Tabor,
182 N.C. 722, 109 S.E. 850 (1921); Sills v. Bethea, 178 N.C. 315, 100 S.E.
593 (1919).
' See cases cited note 7 supra.
'A promise founded on natural love and affection, according to the great
weight of authority is gratuitous and unenforceable. See, e.g., Stewart v.
Damron, 63 Ariz. 158, 160 P.2d 321 (1945); Stabler v. Ramsay, 30 Del.
Ch. 439, 62 A.2d 464 (1948); Wright v. Polk Gen. Hosp., Inc., 95 Ga. App.
821, 99 S.E.2d 162 (1957); Exum v. Lynch, 188 N.C. 392, 125 S.E. 15
(1924). According to a few decisions, however, love and affection growing
out of the relationship of parent and child are sufficient consideration to uphold the contract. Dawley v. Dawley's Estate, 60 Colo. 73, 152 Pac. 1171
(1915); Arnold v. Arnold's Ex'x, 314 Ky. 734, 237 S.W.2d 58 (1951);
Doty v. Dickey, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 900, 96 S.W. 544 (1906). In Puterbaugh
v. Puterbaugh, 131 Ind. 288, 30 N.E. 519 (1892), the court held that the fact
that affection formed an element of consideration in an agreement by an uncle
to make a deed of land to his nephew who had lived with him for twenty-four
years would not impair the force of the contract to convey land. However,
the nephew had fully performed his part of the contract by moving onto the
land and giving his time and labor in improving it.
In Stanback v. Citizens' Natl Bank, 197 N.C. 292, 148 S.E. 313 (1929),
the court said that the recited consideration of one dollar and the grantor's
love and affection for her nephew "is not 'valuable,' that is, not 'founded in
motives of justice'; but it is 'good'-founded on a motive of generosity and
therefore merely voluntary or gratuitous and without valuable consideration."
Id. at 294, 148 S.E. at 314. The court further said that the recital of the
inconsequential sum of one dollar was a mere matter of customary form.

Ibid.
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The court has said in Sills v. Betheaj 0 wherein the wife brought
suit to recover property after her husband's death, that although
the deed of a married woman was invalid to pass title without the
written assent of her husband, it was a good and sufficient contract
to convey. The court pointed out that during the husband's lifetime
the contract could be enforced only by an action for damages11
because the husband could not be compelled to give his written
assent, but after the husband's death and the removal of the restrictions of coverture there was no obstacle to the requirement
that she comply with her contract by specific performance. Therefore, on breach of her contract to convey her land, she is liable for
damages and sale under execution of her land to satisfy the
judgment;"2 or if her husband has predeceased her, specific performance to convey may be enforced against her."3 Thus, by indirection the alieriation of her land without the consent of her husband may be accomplished.
The one remaining disability growing out of the marital unity
of husband and wife seems to be that a married woman cannot convey her realty without the written assent of her husband. She may
acquire and hold any kind of property and without any restriction
whatever, dispose of her personalty;"4 contract freely except as to
her realty between herself and her husband;5 draw checks; ' O make
10 178 N.C. 315, 100 S.E. 593 (1919).
1 See, e.g., Everett v. Ballard, 174 N.C. 16, 93 S.E. 385 (1917); Warren
v. Dail, 170 N.C. 406, 87 S.E. 126 (1915).
1"Miles v. Walker, 179 N.C. 479, 102 S.E. 884 (1920); Everett v.
Ballard, 174 N.C. 16, 93 S.E. 385 (1917) ; Thrash v. Ould, 172 N.C. 728, 90
S.E. 915 (1916); Warren v.Dail, 170 N.C. 406, 87 S.E. 126 (1915); Lipinsky v. Revell, 167 N.C. 508, 83 S.E. 756 (1914). The court said in Thrash v.
Ould, supra at 731, 90 S.E. at 916, "[I1t is no longer an open question, but
is settled, that a married woman is liable upon her contracts, . . . and that
under execution issued upon said judgment her property, real and'personal,
can be sold to the same extent as if she had remained single, though the debt
has not been charged thereon by her."
1" Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1960) ; Sills v. Bethea,
178 N.C. 315, 100 S.E. 593 (1919).
"4N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1950); Rea v. Rea, 156 N.Cz 529, 72 S.E.
873 (1911); Ball v. Paquin, 140 N.C. 83, 52 S.E. 410 (1905); Vann v. Edwards, 135 N.C. 661, 47 S.E. 784 (1904).
1" N.C. Gmx.
STAT. § 52-2 (1950) provides: "Subject to the provisions of
§ 52-12, regulating contracts of wife with husband affecting corpus or income
of estate, every married woman is authorized to contract and deal so as to
affect her real and personal property in the same manner and with the same
effect as if she were unmarried, but no conveyance of her real estate shall be
valid unless made with the written assent of her husband as provided by
section six of article ten of the Constitution, and the execution of the same

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

232

[Vol.42

a will" and her husband has no right to dissent therefrom ;18 insure
her husband's life;19 her earnings are her own property;20 she may

sue alone for any damages for personal injuries or other tort sustained by her and such recovery is her own property ;2 she is liable
for her antenuptial debts, contracts and torts ;22 she is liable for her
torts and for costs or fines incurred in any criminal proceeding
against her;2 and she may sue her husband both in contract and
in tort.2 4 Assuming the husband gives his written consent to the
sale of her land, the money derived therefrom immediately becomes
personalty, and under the constitution and implementing statute,
the wife's sole and separate property, free from the control and debts
of her husband. 5
acknowledged or proven as required by law." This section was held constitutional as valid exercise of legislative power in Warren v. Dail, 170 N.C. 406,
87 S.E. 126 (1915).
6

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-3 (1950).

"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-8 (Supp. 1961) provides: "Every married woman
21 years of age or over has power to devise and bequeath her real and personal
estate as if she were a feme sole; and her will shall be proved as is required
of other wills."
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (Supp. 1961) accorded to husband and wife
reciprocal rights of dissent to the will of the other, but Dudley v. Staton, 257
N.C. 572, 126 S.E.2d 590 (1962), denied this right to the husband by its
ruling that such provision is an unconstitutional abridgement of a wife's right
to make a will of her property as provided in N.C. CoNST. art. X, § 6, and
the implementing statute N.C. GEN. STAT. §'52-1 (1950), "as if she were
unmarried." However, the wife retains her right to dissent from her husband's will of his separate property. See 41 N.C.L. Rsv. 311 (1963) and
1963 DuKE. L.J. 161.

" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-9 (1950) provides: "Any feme covert in her own
name, or in the name of a trustee with his assent, may cause to be insured
for any definite time the life of her husband, for her sole and separate use,
and she may dispose of the interest in the same by will, notwithstanding her
coverture."
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1950).
"1Ibid. Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611
(1945) (husband's common law right of action transferred to wife); Croom
v. Goldsboro Lumber Co., 182 N.C. 217, 108 S.E. 735 (1921) (separate earnings belong to her; may sue alone to recover); Kirkpatrick v. Crutchfield,
348, 100 S.E. 602 (1919) (joinder of husband unnecessary).
17822N.C.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-14 (1950).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-15 (1950) (abolishing common law liability of
husband for tort of wife).
2'

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (Supp. 1961).

In re Will of Witherington,

186 N.C. 152, 119 S.E. 11 (1923) held that a married woman has the fullest
power to bring actions in all cases, even against her husband. Crowell v.
Crowell, 181 N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1921) held that a wife's right to sue
her husband extended to tort actions.
" N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1950); Vann v.
Edwards, 135 N.C. 661, 47 S.E. 784 (1904).
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The requirement that she be joined by her husband in her deed
is not immune to legislative alteration. This is shown by statutes
making the wife a free trader and dispensing with the necessity of
joinder of the husband in cases of certain leases of her realty, legal
separation, abandonment by the husband, and his insanity, all of
which have been upheld as valid legislative limitations on art. X,
section 6.26
The husband's veto power over his wife's conveyance of her real
property by his failure or refusal to join in her conveyance is at
most an anomalous nuisance impeding freedom of conveyance of real
property.17 The requirement that a husband join in his wife's
conveyance is a relic of feudalism2" and has long been abolished in
England and in nearly all the states.2 9 Prior to* 1945, a separate
" Keys v. Tuten, 199 N.C. 368, 154 S.E. 631 (1930); Lancaster v.
Lancaster, 178 N.C. 22, 100 S.E. 120 (1919); Bachelor v. Norris, 166 N.C.
506, 82 S.E. 839 (1914); Vaniford v. Humphrey, 139 N.C. 65, 51 S.E.
893 (1905); Vann v. Edwards, 135 N.C. 661, 47 S.E. 784 (1904); Finger
v. Hunter, 130 N.C. 529, 41 S.E. 890 (1902); Hall v. Walker, 118 N.C. 377,
24 S.E. 6 (1896) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-4 to -6 (1950). These legislative
limitations have been restated and otherwise implemented by N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 52-1 to -3, -7, -8 (1950). See Bolich, Election, Dissent and Renunciation, 39 N.C.L. REv. 17, 28 (1960).
In 1955 N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 was amended by providing as follows:
"Every married woman may exercise powers of attorney conferred upon
her by her husband, including the power to execute and acknowledge deeds
to property owned by her or by herself and her husband or by her husband."
(Emphasis added.)
2' The rule that the husband must join in order to validate her deed makes
it hazardous for a grantee to accept a title which has been conveyed by a
woman since he may be buying a lawsuit and he may lose the property, but
as previously noted he may still have his action for damages. In Buford v.
Mochy, 224 N.C. 235, 29 S.E.2d 729 (1944) (4-3 decision), a woman signed
a deed without disclosing the fact that six days prior thereto she had gone
into another state and remarried the-husband from whom she had been divorced. Later she was allowed to recover the property on the ground that
she had not been joined by her husband.
2
In the absence of a statute permitting a married woman to manage and
control her separate estate as if she were a feme sole, she does not have the
capacity to convey land unless her husband joins in the convyance. BturY,
REAL PROPERTY § 239 (1953); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1359 (3d ed.

1939).

2 Warren v. Dail, 170 N.C. 406, 87 S.E. 126 (1915).
The requirement
of the husband's joinder has been abolished in all states except Alabama,
Florida, Indiana, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. 1 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 118 (1949).
A. A. CODE tit. 34, § 73 (1959) (husband must join in

deed but not in her lease); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 693.01 (1944) (joinder not
required by constitution); IND. STAT. ANN. § 38-102 (Bums 1949), "Provided, however, that she shall be bound by estoppel in pais, like any other
person." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 64

(1930).

As of 1961, a married woman in Texas may elect to have the "sole
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and private examination was required for the wife in dealing with
her separate property, the court saying that this was "to secure her
against coercion and undue influence from him."' 0 Now that this
protective factor against the influence of the husband in her dealings
with third persons has been removed,"' we are left with his "veto
power" 32 over her real property transactions "to afford her his
protection against the wiles and insidious arts of others ....
,,
The court in Stallings v. Walker, 4 explained the requirement that
the husband join in his wife's deed more realistically with these
words:
It is true that the husband, under our Constitution, Art. X,
sec. 6, has no interest as husband in his wife's property, real or
personal. The provision that he must give his written assent to
conveyances by her of realty is the sole survival in our Constitution of the ancient idea that a wife must be under the guardianship and control of her husband and is incompetent to transact
business. This requirement in our Constitution is omitted in
nearly all other State constitutions. It is not based upon his
having any interest in his wife's land, nor on his having a vested
interest therein at her death, for she has full authority to devise
the same without his consent and deprive him of any interest .... 34a
Under our law the husband has no right to dissent from his
wife's will, 5 although she may dissent from his will. 6 The husband
management, control and disposition of her separate property" and convey
it without the joinder of her husband. TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 4614(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1962). The desirability of a statute validating deeds by
married women is discussed in 12 FLA. L.J. 245 (1938).
" Ferguson v. Kinsland, 93 N.C. 337, 339 (1885).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-14.1 (Supp. 1961). This section does not repeal
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (1950), requiring private examination of the wife
when conveying her real property to her husband. Honeycutt v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 89 S.E.2d 598 (1955).
32 Stallings v. Walker, 176 N.C. 321, 324, 97 S.E. 25, 26 (1918).
Ferguson v. Kinsland, 93 N.C. 337, 339 (1885).
176 N.C. 321, 97 S.E. 25 (1918).
81Id. at 323-24, 97 S.E. at 26. (Emphasis added.)
"8See note 18 supra. Gomer v. Askew, 242 N.C. 547, 89 S.E.2d 117
(1955). See DOUGLAS, ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA
§§ 18, 48, 158 (1948). The rights of husband and wife to dissent from each
others' wills are the same in most states except Florida, Georgia, Missouri
and North Carolina. In most jurisdictions the surviving spouse is given by
statute full discretionary power to dissent. A few states in addition to
North Carolina qualify the right. See KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-602(2)
(1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-603 (Supp. 1961) ; LA. CIv. CODE art.
2382 (1952); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 667-70 (1957); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAw
§ 18; N.C. Gz:N. STAT. § 30-1 (Supp. 1961).
"' "Under the statute in effect and operative as to persons dying prior to
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has-a veto power over the conveyances of his wife of her separate
realty although he has no interest, therein. The wife has no similar
veto power over the conveyances of her husband of his separate
realty except that without her joinder it remains subject to the
elective life estate. 7 His separate deed is valid while her separate
deed is invalid. Thus the right of husband and wife to transfer their
respective separate property is unequal. It would seem that public
policy would be better served if the legal rights of the husband and
wife in each other's property were the same. This would involve an
amendment to our constitution which would empower the General
Assembly to eliminate the distinction in treatment of the property
rights of husband and wife as now found in the law and give the
General Assembly the power to make their rights equal. By equalizing their rights, the husband could dissent from his wife's will
under the same provisions as provided for the wife's dissent under
the Intestate Succession Act."
Instead of the husband's joinder
in his wife's deed being'a condition precedent to its validity, his
joinder would only signify a release of his power of election. 9 In
this manner neither spouse could pauperize or leave the other destitute on society.
In the principal case the husband had no interest in the land, yet
his failure to *join in her deed defeated the obvious intent of the
grantor that her children by her first, marriage have the property
which had belonged to their father and to her as tenants by the
entirety and which had come to her as survivor., This requirement
of assent seems to be anachronistic and paradoxical in view of the
reiloval of practiqally all of the legalistic comm6n law disabilities
imposed upon a married woman, and, at best, seems; to'burden the
July 1,1960, the effect of a dissent was to give the. widow the same rights
and estateg in real and personal property'6f her husband as if he had died

ihtestate, i.e., dower, year's allowance, 'and intestate share."' Bolich, supra
note '36,at 32: .N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-149, 29-1 (8), 30-2 t6-5, -15 (1950).
Chdshire.v. Drewry, 213 N.C. 450, 197 S.E. 1 (.1938). DOUGLAS, op. cit.
supra.note 46, §§ 18, 48(c). The 1959 Session of the General Assembly
abolished dower'and curtesy. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (Supp. 1961). Under'-the n'ew act the right to dissent is: confined to' situations where she receives leis. than a certain minimum share as defined therein. N.C. GEN.

1 .I
§§ 30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1961).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1961) (electibn' to -take life interest

STAT.

in'li~u"
"
8 of intesfafe share).'
- "'N.C.'GEN.
STAT. §§30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1961), as, amended N.C.

§ 30-1(a) (Supp. 1961).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1961).

STAT.

GEN."
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transfer of realty without providing any substantial benefits to either
spouse. The remedy for this situation calls for an amendment to the
present constitution, which, with respect to this requirement, seems
both illogical and outmoded.
ANN H. PHILLIPs

Federal Jurisdiction-Three Judge Courts-AbstentionAppellate Jurisdiction
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein' makes two significant decisions dealing with the jurisdiction of three judge courts
and appeal from a district court's denial to convene such a court.
The result is to simplify and clarify this area of federal jurisdiction.
A novel feature of our judicial system, the three judge federal
court is an important buffer in the conflict of state and federal law.
A three judge court is properly convened when petitioner seeks to
enjoin the enforcement of a state or federal statute as being unconstitutional.2 If the case is proper the district judge certifies the
case to the chief judge of the circuit, who convenes the special
court. The full court includes in its three members one circuit
judge and the district judge before whom the case is pending."
Appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court.'
The three judge court was created by Congress in response to
public demand. Ex Parte Young5 held that a single federal district
judge could enjoin a state official from enforcing an unconstitutional
1370 U.S. 713 (1962) (per .uriam).
2"An

interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement,
operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any
officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an
order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State
statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon
the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application
therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under
section 2284 of this title." 28 U.S.C. §2281 (1958). 28 U.S.C. §2282
(1958) applies the same rule to federal statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1958)
outlines the composition and procedure of the three judge court. Other
actions requiring a three judge court are cases seeking to set aside an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1950) and to enjoin a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act in which an expediting certificate has been filed by the U.S. Attorney General, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 15
U.S.C. § 28 (1958).
328 U.S.C. § 2284(1) (1958).
'28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958). Direct appeal is allowed because of the
dignity of the special court and the cases are generally of extreme importance. See 47 Gro. L.J. 161, 169 (1958).
209 U.S. 123 (1908).

